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[L. A. No. 18907. In Bank. Apr. 17, 1945.] 
BETTY RUTH L. VINER et at, Respondents, v. MARY 
. UNTRECHT, Appellant. . 
[1] Appeal- Questions of Law and Fact - Extent of Power of 
Conn.-Where a judgment is attacked on the ground that it is 
Dot 8upported, the power of the appellate court. ends when it 
KeK. Dig. Beferences: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1285; [2] Trusts, 
§ 129; [3] Trusts, § 128; [4] Trusts, § 106; [5-7] Trusts, § 117; 
[8] Trusts, 195; [9] Trusts, § 287; [10] Innkeepers, 17(2); [11] 
Appeal and Error, § 1237; [12] Costs, § 32; Damages, 149; [13] 
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once determines that there is substantial evidence which will 
support the conclusions of the trial court. 
[2] Trusts-Resulting Trusts-Evidence"':::"Review. - Whether the 
evidence to prove the existence of a resulting trust is clear, 
satisfactory and convincing is primarily a question for the 
trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to 
suppOrt its .conclusion, the determination is not open to review 
on appeal. Likewise, in such cases the credibility and weight 
of the evidence are exclusively for the trial court. 
[Sa, Sb] lei. - Resulting Trusts....::..Evidence--Sufficiency.-Findings 
that defendant advanced money to plaintiff to enable plaintiff 
to acquire property, took title to secure a loan and held the 
property under a resulting trust, were sustained by defend-
ant's admissions in a divorce action; by a statement to her 
sister that the property belonged to plaintiff; by evidence that 
title was taken in defendant's name because the grantor 
declined to convey to plaintiff; by evidence that defendant 
never claimed ownership when she lived on the premises prior 
to her written repudiation of the lending agreement; and by 
the language of the reputation itself. 
[4] ld. - Resulting Trusts - Furnishing Oonsideration for Pur-
chase.-Where the purchase price of real property is paid by 
one person and the title is taken in the name of another, a 
reSUlting trust arises in favor of the payor. (Civ. Code, § 853.) 
[5] ld.-Resulting Trusts-Furnishing Oonsidera.tion for Purchase 
-Loan by Grantee. - To constitute a resulting trust when 
consideration is furnished for the purchase of. real property. 
it is not always necessary that payment of the purchase price 
be made by the claimant of the beneficial interest. The pay-
ment may be made by the transferee whell the money paid 
constitutes a loan from the transferee to the claimant. 
[6] Id.-ResultingTrusts-Furnishing Oonsideration for Purchase 
-Loan by Grantee-Loan of Oredit.-A resulting trust is not 
prevented by the transferee's assumption of an obligation to 
the vendor or transferor to pay the purchase price, where the 
claimant is obligated to reimburse the transferee. In such a 
ease there is loan of credit by the transferee to the claimant. 
(]?isapproving of statement in Lincoln v. OhamberZain, 61 Cal. 
App. 399,.214 P. 1013, that the money must be actually paid 
by the claimant "at or before the execution of the convey-
ance.") . 
[7] ld.-B.esul\ing Trusts-Furnishing OODSidera.tion for Purchase 
-LOa.n 1»7 Gra.ntee.-A loan of money by the grantee to en-
able the borrower to purchase the property raises an impliec1 i 
[4] See 15 Oa.Uur. 178. 
.... 
) 
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promise by the borrower to repay the loan. and no express 
promise is necessary to constitute a resulting trust. 
[8] ld.-Resulting Trusts-Effect of Oral Agreement.-A resulting 
trust is not prevented from arising by the existence of an un-
enforceable oral agreement that the transferee of the property 
is to hold it in trust for the claiii11tnt. 
[9] ld. - Enforcement - Actions::':"'Conditions Precedent-Tender. 
-In an action to enforce ·-a resulting trust against a, lender 
who advanced money for the purchase of real property, title 
to which was taken in the lender's name, it was not a necessary 
eondition precedent for the beneficiary to tender the borrowed 
money, where the lender had declined to render a statement 
and had repudiated the loan agreement. 
[10] lnnkeepers-Evidence-Sufficiency.-In an action to enforce 
a resulting trust, the evidence supported a finding that the 
lender was not a boarding-house keeper so as to be entitled to 
a lien on personal property on the premises, and was not the 
owner of the chattels, where she was present at a conversation 
when an agent of the borrower was employed to operate the 
premises, and where she neither brought any of said person-
alty on the premises nor made a payment on that which was 
purchased. 
[l1J Appeal- Questions of Law and Fact - Oredibility of Wit-
nesses. - An appellate court cannot retry the comparative 
veracity or accuracy of witnesses on matters pertaining to the 
amount due a party. 
[12] Costs-Items Allowable-Attorney's Fees: Damages-Attor-
ney's Fees.-Generally, fees paid to attorneys are not recover-
able from the opposing party either as costs, damages or other-
wise, in the absence of express statutory or contractual 
authority. 
[13J Trover-Damages-Attorney's Fees.-Attorney's fees are not 
recoverable under Civ. Code, § 3336, declaring that the detri-
ment caused by the wrongful conversion of personal property 
is presumed to be "a fair compensation for the time and 
money properly expended in pursuit of the property." 
[14] Damages-Exemplary Damages-Attorney's Fees.-It is im- ... 
proper to include attorney's fees as a part of exemplary dam-
[8] Rights of parties under oral agreement to buy land for an-
other, note,'42 A.L.R. 10, 55. See, also, 12 Cal.Jur. 886; 25 Cal. 
Jur. 170, 179. 
[12] See "7 Cal.Jur. 286; 8 Cal.Jur. 801; 24 Cal.Jur. 1055; 14 
Am.Jur. 38; 15 Am.Jur. 550. 
) 
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ages, and an award of such fees as such cannot be upheld r.s 
constituting an award of punitive damages. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Conrt of 
Los Angeles County. Roy V. Rhodes, Judge. Modified and 
affirmed. 
Action to enforce a resulting trust. Judgment for plain-
tiffs modified and affirmed without costs on appeal. 
Arthur E. Briggs and J. B. Mandel for Appellant. 
S. L. Kurland and W. L. Pollard for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-We have examined the record in this case 
and adopt the decision of the District Court of Appeal of 
the Second Appellate District, Division Two, prepared by 
:Mr. Presiding Justice Moore, with the omissions, alterations 
and additions hereinafter appearing: 
"This action was brought to enforce a resulting trust. All 
of the material allegations of the complaint were found to 
be true and those of the cross-complaint substantially con-
trary to the complaint were found to be untrue. Also, the 
court found that defendant's maintenance of her claims of 
ownership of the realty and of her claims of lien upon cer-
tain movables of plaintiffs was in bad faith by reason of 
which plaintiffs were awarded ••• attorney's fees in the 
sum of $1,000. From the ensuing judgment defendant has 
brought this appeal upon seven grounds [most of] which 
may be summed up in one phrase: Insufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the findings and the judgment. 
"Prior to Noyember 15, 1940, plaintiff, Betty Ruth L. 
Viner, herein at times referred to as Ruth. was president of 
the Business Women's Association, a nonprofit California 
corporation. She and her corporation were associated with 
the Western States University, also a nonprofit California 
corporation. The two corporations having interests in the 
several properties involved in this action joined with Mrs. 
Viner as plaintiffs to establish their respective claims against 
a common adversary. Inasmuch as the right of each of the 
plaintiffs as against one another is immaterial to a decision, 
DO effort will be made to keep distinct their respective in-
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"Prior to November 1, 1940, Ruth had become associated 
with defendant Mary Untrecht. About that date, having in-
vestigated and negotiated for the acquisition of a hou~e on 
behalf of the association, Ruth decided to undertake the pur-
chase of a fourteen-room residence, herein referred to ;;~ 
'La Brea House,' for the sum of $6,300, on terms, 10 per N'nt 
payable in cash, the balance in deferred payments. In order 
to effect such purchase. Ruth, on behalf of the association, 
agreed with Mary that if the latter would lend the aS80c:a1ion 
as much 8..'1 $1,500 in order to consummate the transaction, 
to make certain improvements, to buy certain furnishings b.nd 
to pay the accrued taxes and assessments, she should be repaid 
her advances with interest at 7 per cent per annum com-
pounded; receive instructions in comptometry and bookkeep-
ing; and have the use of a residential room free of charge. 
As security for the repayment of her loan, it was agreed that 
the title to the property should be vested in defendant. Ar-
rangements for the purchase were concluded on Jannary 3, 
1941, when Mary deposited in the escrow the sum of $715, 
and she was named grantee in the conveyance of La Brea 
house. The association installed it.s furniture and furnishinr-s, 
leased to Mrs. Viner certain residential rooms, which lease 
was ratified by [defendant], and, pursuant to the loan agree-
ment had Mary occupy the room she had selected for herself. 
Ruth moved her furniture into the house, and both women 
continued to reside there until the repudiation of the loan con-
tract by Mary. In the following month [defendant) advanced 
an additional $200 to the association and thereafter maue 
other payment..'l on account of the property. 
"Simultaneously with the foregoing events the association 
leased certain space in the building to the University for the 
storage of its 165 law books, comptometer and other equip" 
ment, and this tenant agreed to carry out the association's con-
tract with [defendant) by giving her the promised technical 
training. For fifteen months Mary continued to reside in the 
house and to receive instructions from the University which 
tuition was of the reasonable value of $300. After the occu-
pancy of the house by the two women Ruth made practically 
all of the installment payments on the purchase price, paid 
the taxes and assessments, the uti1ities and expense of opera-
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eiation extended Ruth's lease for another year in considera-
tion of her continuing the same payments. This she did until 
July 15, 1942. 
"On July 4, 1942 [defendant) informed the association 
that she was the owner, demanded possession of the property; 
declared the association had no interest therein, and repudi-
ated all agreements. theretofore made with Ruth. The asso-
ciation requested. a statement of its indebtedness on account 
of moneys advanced by l\:t:ary but that lady denied the exist-
ence of any such indebtedness. Following her oral and writ-
ten demands for possession of the realty, Mary asserted a 
lodging-house lien upon the furniture and furnishings of 
Ruth and of the association and on September 10th she posted 
notice of sale of such effects pursuant to section 1861, Civil 
Code, for the purpose of satisfying her demand for moneys 
advanced in the sum of $3,142. The total of all moneys ad-
vanced by Mary in connection with the purchase and improve-
ment of the property was $1,679.62. Besides her own occu-
pancy, after the repudiation, Mary received net rentals as in-
come from the house [in the amount of] $623.55. The Univer-
sity owns the movables it had placed in the house under its 
lease from the association. Although Mary had no interest in 
them she took them away and held them without any claim of 
right. Their value is $3,000. That corporation and Ruth were 
both required to employ counsel to effect a recovery and the 
reasonable value of such service to each of them is· the sum 
of $500. 
"The foregoing facts having been found to be true the 
[trial court concluded as follows] : 
"(1) At all times the association was the equitable owner 
of La Brea house. (2) Defendant held title for the associa-
tion, subject to her lien for advances; but (3) she had no right 
to the possession of the property to the exclusion of [plain-
t5ff.s 1. (4) By virtue of their leases, Ruth and the University 
were entitled to occupy certain rooms which they entered as 
tenants of the association and occupied February 1, 1941; 
(5) neither was Mary a boarding-house keeper, nor was Ruth 
her guest, but on the contrary, (6) she was herself a mere 
lodger in the house. (7) She had no lien upon, claim to, or 
legal interest in, the law books and bookkeeping machines 
taken by her from the University or to any of the chattels 
claimed by Ruth, therefore Mar~' shonld pay to Ruth and the 
University the $1,000 counsel fees and •••• (9) The associa-
/ 
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tion is entitled to all moneys heretofore collected as rentals 
on the La Brea house and to. an accounting of all moneys 
paid her as rentals therefor after July 4, 1942, besides the' 
$623.55. she accounted for' prior to judgment. 
[1] "It is fundamental that where a judgment is attacked 
on the ground that it is not supported, the power of the ap-
pellate court ends when it shall once have determined that 
there is substantial evidence which will support the conrlu-
sions of the trial court." (See Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal. 
2d 808 [141 P.2d 732]; Watson v. Poore, 18 Ca1.2d 302 [115 P. 
2d 478].) [2] And that rule is applicable where the action 
is one to enforce a resulting. truSt. Whether the evidence to 
prove the existence of the trust is clear, satisfactory and con-
vincing "is primarily a question for the trial court to deter-
mine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its con-
clusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal." 
(Stromerson v. Averill, supra, at p. 815. See, also, Beeler, v. 
American Trust Co., 24 Ca1.2d 1 [147 P.2d 583].) Likewise, 
in such cases the credibility and weight of the evidence are 
exclusively for the trial court. (Watson v. Poore, supra; 
Strornerson v. Aven'll, supra.) 
[3a] "The proof found to support the findings and judg-
ment consists of two eases, to wit: (1) the declarations and 
affidavits of [defendant] and (2) the testimony of [plaintiffs] 
and their witnesses. Defendant testified that she purchased 
the La Brea home for herself and that the association was 
never mentioned in reference to the property. However, on 
October 29, 1940, she executed an affidavit to be filed in her 
divorce action in the superior court in which she averred 
that her sole possession was a $200 interest in a life insurance 
policy. On June 19. 1941, six months after taking title to the 
La Brea property she filed her verified amended complaint 
in the same action alleging that she was indigent .... In the 
verified divorce pleading she alleged that she was so ill from 
October, 1940, to June, 1941, that she was unable to do any 
work. In the present action she alleged under oath (1) that 
during the same period she acted as secretary; office attendant, 
and instructor for the association in its downtown office and 
that such services were worth $1,540; and (2) that during 
the same period she was acting as housekeeper for [plaintiffs] 
and did an 'of the work for the roomers and for [plaintiffs] 
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rooms, and that such services were reasonably worth $1,690. 
"The testimony of Mrs. Viner established that she located 
the La Brea house as a desirable property and that Mary ac-
('ompanied her to visit the premises. They had many meetings 
at which the house was shown to certain members of the asso-
ciation and Mary finillly agreed to lend to the association funds 
not to exceed $1';500 in order to complete the purchase and 
repairs. Ruth conducted all negotiations; dictated all lette1'8 
for Mary's signature and told the agent of the grantor that 
the title would be taken in the name of [defendant] in order 
to comply with the requirements of the bank which declined 
to convey to an eleemosynary corporation. Mary was present 
at all of the conferences had with the seller or its agent; was 
present at the time the escrow was opened; advanced $715 
for the down payment and other outlays and later gave Ruth 
$200 as a part of the sums she had promised to advance. At 
the time the escrow was opened Mary stated to her that she 
hesitated to take title to the property in her own name by 
reason of the pendency of her divorce action. 
"The witness Ware, licensed real estate broker, testified 
that, in his presence at about the time the escrow was opened, 
[defendant] stated that they could not buy the property under 
the· name of the association on account of its credit standing 
and that it was taken by her in trust for the association to be 
conveyed to it at the proper time. The witness Kohan, sister 
of Ruth, established that in the summer of 1942 Mary told 
her that the property belonged to the association; that she 
desired to collect the moneys she had loaned to make the pur-
chase; that it could be sold at a profit if she and Ruth could 
share in it; that if it were not sold 'she would use any means 
possible to make her sell it so she could get her loan there-
from.' One Shoup made a oontract for the painting of the 
house with Mrs. Viner and Mrs. Snyder, president and secre-
tary of the association. He testified that he never discussed 
the painting with [defendant] during the several weeks he 
was there employed .... When defendant gave notice of her 
repudiation her language was that 'all agreements between 
you and Mrs. Untrecht are hereby terminated and cancelled.' 
From such language of her counsel, in the light of other proof, ... 
it is a reasonable inference that defendant acknowledged 
that she had. made a contract with Mrs. Viner on terms 
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From the forcgoing it is apparent that we have an agree-
mcnt between plaintiffs and defendant under which the latter 
agreed to lend money to the former for t.he purchase of real 
property, the title to which was to be taken in the name of 
defendant who was to hold it in trust for plaintiffs. There-
after, and pursuant to that agreement, the loan was made by 
defendant to plaintiffs and as a part of the same transaction 
the money representing the loan was paid by defendant to the 
vendor of the property 1'8.ther than to plaintiffs, and defend-
ant became obligated to make the balance of the payments 
on the property. The property was accordingly conveyed to 
defendant. The rules of law applicable to those facts are 
clear. [4] In the ordinary case a resulting trust arises in 
favor of the payor of the purchase price of the property 
where the purchase price is paid by one person and the title 
is taken in the name of another (Civ. Code, § 853: 25 Cal.Jur. 
178.) [15] It is not always necessary that the payment of 
the purchase price be made by the claimant of the beneficial 
int.ere.<;t. It may be made by the transferee when it consti-
tutes a loan from the transferee to the claimant. (Watson 
v. Poore, ~upra; Millard v. Hathaway, 27 Cal. 119: Walton 
v. Karnes, 67 Cal. 255 [7 P. 676]; Ward v. Matthews, 73 Cal. 
13 (14 P. 604]; Hellman v. Messmer, 75 Cal. 166 r16 P. 766]; 
White v. Oostigan, 138 Cal. 564 (72 P. 178]; Breitenbucher 
v. Oppenheim, 160 Cal. 98 rU6 P. 551: Brown v. Spencer, 
163 Cal. 589 (126 P. 4931; O'Rourke v. Skellinger, 169 Cal. 
270 [146P. 633): Webb v. Vercoe, 201 Cal. 754 [258 P. 1099, 
54 A.L.R. 1200); Schumacher v. lAngford, 20 Cal.App. 61 
[127 P. 10571; Orozier v. Soquel, 101 Cal.App. 402 [281 P. 
698]; Penziner v. West American Finance 00., 133 Cal.App. 
578 [24 P.2d 501); see Stromerson v. Avert'll, supra; Hidden 
v. Jordan, 21 Cal. 92; Sandfoss v. Jones, 35 Cal. 481: 0'0011.-
nor v. lrvine, 74 Cal. 435 [16 P. 236]; Hellman v. Messmer, 
SUl)ra; Rest., Trust, § 448.) [6] Nor is a resulting trust 
prevented by an a.'lSumption by the t1'8.nsferee of an obligation 
to the vendor or transferor to pay the purchase price, where ... 
the claimant is obligated to reimburse the transferee. In such 
a case there is loan of credit by the t1'8.nsferee to the claimant 
(Watson v. Poore, supra; see Stromerson v. Averill, S'Upra; 
Rest., Trusts, § 456, comment d). The ease of Lincoln v. 
ChambcT1ain, 61 Cal.App. 399 [214 P. 1013], is distinguish-
able inasmuch as there was no loan by the transferee in that 
) 
) 
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case to the claimant at or prior to the time of the transaction. 
After the transaction the claimant promised •. to pay for the 
property. The statement therein that: " .•• it must be 
shown that the party setting up thE." trust paid the money 
either at or before the execution of t1:e conve~·ance and as a 
part of the original transaction of purchase," is out of har-
mony with the foregoing authorities and must be disapproved 
in so far as it requires that the money be actually paid by 
the claimant "at or before the execution of the conveyance." 
[7] Contrary to defendant's contention it is not necessary 
that there be an express agreement by the elaimant to repay 
the loan. An agreement to repay may be implied. (Brown 
v. Spencer, supra; Couts v. Winston, 153 Cal 686 [96 P. 
357).) Of course, the trustee of th.e resulting trust holds 
the legal title as security for the loan. (Watson v. Poore, 
supra; Stromerson v. Averill, supra.) 
[8] Defendant contendS that there can be no resulting 
trust because there was an express agreement between the 
parties that defendant would make the loan and hold title in 
trust for plaintiffs. Where the elements of a resulting trust 
are present, the fact that transferee and payor of the purchase 
price, and the claimant, made an oral agreement that the 
former was to hold the property in trust for the latter which 
was unenforceable under the statute of frauds or otherwise, 
does not prevent a resulting trust from arising. Indeed, such 
agreement supports the inference or presumption that the 
payor did not intend that the transferee should have the bene-
ficial interest. (See Bayles v. Baxter, 22 Cal. 575; Breiten-
bucher v. Oppenheim, 160 Cal. 98 [116 P. 55]; Stromerson 
v. Aven1l, IUpra; Watson v. Poore, supra; Gerety v. O'Shee-
han, 9 Cal.App. 447 [99 P. 545]; Pavlovich v. Pavlovich, 22 
Cal.App. 500 [135 P. 303]; Root v. Kuhn, 51 CalApp. 600 
[197 P. 150]; Juranek v. Juranek, 29 Cal.App.2d 276 [84 
P.2d 195]; Rest., Trust, § 441, comment j; 12 Mich.L.Rev. 
427; 42 A.L.R. 10, 55.) 
[OJ The trust is not defeated by the failure of the as-
sociation to tender the borrowed moneys. 
"Mary's declination to render a statement and her repu-
diation of the loan agreement and the trust rendered further 
tenders idle·and unnecessary (Penziner v. West American 
Finance Co., 133 CalApp. 578, 586 [24 P.2d 501]). 
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justify a judicial defeat of the trust relationship. [Defend-
ant] was free to make the loan. She received a va,Juable 
consideration for it. She continued to enjoy the relationship 
for eighteen months at the expiration of which she was free 
to enforce her lien for the moneys she had advanced. 
[3b] "It is thus demonstrated that the findings with 
reference to the La Brea property find abundant and sub-
tial support in the record leaving this court without power 
to alter the conclusions derived by the court below." 
In the light of the law above set forth none of the authori-
ties cited by defendant is controlling in the instant case. 
[10] "The evidence is equally abundant to support the 
findings that the University owns the personal property which 
it claimed, that Ruth was not a guest of Mary; that [defend-
ant] is not the owner of the chattels used by the association 
in the La Brea house and that the only moneys advanced by 
Mary to the association were those used for the purchase and 
for taxes and improvement of the property. [Defendant] wit· 
nessed the conversation whereby Ruth was employed to oper-
ate the house. The latter engaged a number of employees to 
do the menial tasks from February, 1941, till May, 1942. By 
her own testimony and that of Mrs. Munson, Mrs. Schneider 
and Miss Yaryan, Ruth established that Mary neither brought 
any furniture iilto the house nor made a payment on that 
which was purchased, and that she did no work either as a 
domestic or as instructor for [plaintiffs]. Because of such 
proof and its acceptance by the court, [defendant's] asserted 
claims of a lien as an innkeeper upon the personal property 
in the La Brea house are utterly without right (Fox v. Win-
dermere Hotel A. Co., 30 Cal.App. 162 [157 P. 820]) ... ." 
[11] Defendant "complains that the amount of her award 
should have been $2,489.31 instead of $1,679.62, allowed by 
the judgment. In support of this she cites her own testimony 
with reference to a payment she made to the painter, the 
eon stant tendency of Mrs. Viner to exaggerate, and the mis-
statement of Exhibit 39. For reasons heretofore recited we 
cannot retry the comparative veracity or accuracy of tlie wit-
nesses. On the contrary, the findings and decision deter-
mined that Mary is entitled to a total of $1,679.62, the full 
amount of her· loans, but that she is indebted to [plaintiffsl 
for net rentals collected, $623.55; . . . counsel fees, $1,000, 
[and] costs in the sum of $208.35." 
.... 
) 
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The court reserved the right to a further accounting 
when defendant had complied with the decree. 
The plaintiffs alleged that defendant without right or claim 
of right has willfully failed to return the personal property 
for the purpose of harassing them and that they are entitled 
to $1,000 punitive damages and $1,000 attorney's fees ex-
pended in pursuit of that property. 'l'he court found the alle-
gation true but did not award punitive damages, rather it 
found that plaintiffli had incurred attorney's fees in the sum 
of $1,000 in pursuit of the property and awarded that amount. 
[12] Generally, fees paid to attorneys are not recoverable 
from the opposing party either as costs, damages or otherwise 
in the absence of express statutory or contractual authority. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1021; 7 Cal.Jur. 286-288; 8 Cal.Jur. 801-
802; 24 Cal.Jur. 1055-1056.) [13] Plaintiffs rely upon sec-
tion 3336 of the Civil Code declaring the detriment caused 
by the wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed 
to be "a fair compensation for the time and money properly 
expended in pursuit of the property." Attorney's fees are 
not recoverable under that section. (Hays v. Windsor, 130 
Cal. 230 [62 P. 395]; W. R. Bradshaw & Co. v. Eggers, 27 
Cal.App. 132 [148 P. 961); Nicholls v. Mapes, 1 Cal.App. 
349 [82 P. 265]; see Murphy v. Mulgrew, 102 Cal. 547 (36 P. 
857, 41 Am.St.Rep. 200]; Spooner v. Cady, 5 Cal.Unrep. 357 
[44 P. 1018]; Greenbaum v. Martinez, 86 Cal. 459 [25 P. 12]; 
Martland v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 19 Cal.App. 283 [125 
P. 759]; Drinkhouse v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359 [260 P. 8691 ; 
Harris v. Smith, 132 Cal. 316 [64 P. 409]; Holm v. Davis, 
8 Cal.App.2d 328 r 47 P.2d 537].) 
[14] Plaintiffs assert that the allegations in their com-
plaint and statements in the findings concerning attorney's 
fees should be ignored or interpreted as really referring to 
punitive damage. While it is true that the court found the 
detention of plaintiff's property was without claim of right 
and for the purpose of harassing plaintiffs, yet no punitive 
damages are awarded and the findings unequivocally made an 
award of attorney's fees rather than punitive damages. For 
illustration, with reference to plaintiff Western States Uni-
versity, the court found that it "has been required to employ 
••. attorneys at law, ..• as its attorneys in order to secure 
a return of said property, and has incurred an attorneys' fee 
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titled to judgment in said sum, which said sum is a reasonable 
sum, therefor." . 
We find no room for interpretation in the matter. More-
over, it is improper to include attorney's fees as a part of 
exemplary damages. (Howell v. Scoggins, 48 Cal. 355; Falk 
v. Waterman,49 Cal. 224.) Accordingly, the judgment should 
be modified by striking therefrom the item of $500 for attor-
'ney's fees awarded each of the plaintiffs, and as so modified, 
the judgment is affirmed. Neither party to recover costs on 
this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur. My views with respect to the 
scope of appellate review in eases where "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" is required are set forth in my dissenting opin-
ions in Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal.2d 808, 817 [141 P.2d 
732], and Beeler v. A.meric(m Trust Co., 24 Ca1.2d 1.29 [147 
P.2d 583]. These views remain unchanged, but the rule an-
nounced in those cases now governs the scope of appellate 
review in this state. 
) 
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